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I.

INTRODUCTION

However articulated, the law of negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED)
[I]s fundamentally concerned with striking a balance
between two opposing objectives: first, promoting the
underlying purpose of negligence law––that of
compensating persons who have sustained emotional
injuries attributable to the wrongful conduct of others;
and second, avoiding the trivial or fraudulent claims that
have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective
1
nature of these injuries.
The challenge is to refine “principles of liability to remedy
violations of reasonable care while avoiding speculative results or
2
punitive liability.” Courts are often skeptical of mental anguish
damages because they are easy to fabricate and exaggerate, and
difficult to confirm, measure, and quantify. Accordingly, most
courts recognize that there is generally no duty to avoid negligently
inflicting emotional distress on others unless the activity falls within
3
a narrow exception.
1. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996).
2. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980).
3. E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal. 1993)
(“There is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another . . .
.”); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594–96 (Tex. 1993) (rejecting the contention
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Under Minnesota law, unless specifically authorized by statute
the only exceptions to this general “no duty rule” are where (1) the
emotional distress arose out of a physical injury (the “physical
injury” rule); (2) the emotional distress arose out of the plaintiff’s
exposure to physical danger (the “zone of danger” rule); and (3)
“there has been some conduct on the part of defendant
constituting a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or
other like willful, wanton, or malicious conduct” (the “direct
4
invasion” rule).
An increasing trend in other jurisdictions is to recognize a
duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress, independent
of a physical injury or danger of physical injury, where the
defendant violates some legal interest of the plaintiff involving a
5
highly emotional subject matter.
Types of activities typically
6
triggering this rule include misdiagnosing serious diseases,
7
psychological malpractice, injuring a baby during or shortly after
8
9
delivery, and mishandling corpses. This article refers to the rule
adopted in these cases as the “independent duty rule.” Although
there is little consensus on how to define the scope of the
independent duty rule, cases applying the rule can be generally
grouped into three categories: (1) cases finding an independent

that there is a general duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress on
others); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986) (“[Traditionally
t]here was no duty with respect to negligent acts which caused purely mental harm
where there was no impact or threat of impact upon someone in the zone of
danger.”).
4. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560
(Minn. 1996).
5. Because independent duty cases typically involve breaching a duty owed
directly to the plaintiff, they are distinguishable from bystander cases, where the
plaintiff only witnesses the breach against the directly impacted victim. See also
Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992) (“[Bystander cases] all
arise in the context of physical injury or emotional distress caused by the negligent
conduct of a defendant with whom the plaintiff had no preexisting relationship,
and to whom the defendant had not previously assumed a duty of care beyond
that owed to the public in general.”); Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 204
(Alaska 1995) (quoting Burgess for the same proposition); Sacco v. High Country
Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 419 (Mont. 1995) (“Bystander victims are those
who observe the injury or death of another person and suffer resultant emotional
distress.”). This article does not address bystander recovery.
6. E.g., Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 205.
7. E.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 358 (Fla. 2002).
8. E.g., Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981).
9. E.g., Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891).
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duty because of a special relationship between the parties; (2)
cases finding an independent duty because emotional distress was a
11
foreseeable consequence of the breach; and (3) cases finding an
independent duty for specified categories of emotionally-charged
12
activities as a matter of public policy. A tentative draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
13
Harm (Third Restatement) endorses this third approach.
This article provides a brief overview of Minnesota law on
14
recovering damages for emotional distress,
collects and
summarizes foreign authorities endorsing and defining the
15
independent duty rule, and advocates for adopting a narrow
16
independent duty rule in Minnesota. If carefully constructed, the
independent duty rule is more consistent with the roots of
Minnesota law on emotional distress claims, better serves the
general principle of providing compensation for legitimate
injuries, adequately guards against frivolous claims reaching juries,
does not upset any of the justifications traditionally cited for
denying NIED recovery, and makes sense from a public policy
standpoint.
The proposed rule takes an approach similar to that tentatively
endorsed by the Third Restatement, but would include guidelines
17
for courts when defining categories of protected activities. Some
courts have borrowed the guidelines that many courts use when
determining whether to make an exception to the general duty
18
rule in physical injury cases. These guidelines, however, do not
adequately advance the main objective in defining categories of
activities deserving of protection from negligently inflicted
emotional distress—providing a threshold guarantee that only
genuine emotional injuries can reach juries. Accordingly, courts
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. E.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 (Alaska 2002); Burgess v.
Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205–09 (Cal. 1992); Friedman v. Merck & Co.,
131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 891 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 203–04 (Wyo.
2003).
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should analyze whether there is a duty to avoid negligently
inflicting emotional distress on a categorical basis—as opposed to
examining the facts of each individual case—by considering a
number of factors:
1. Does the relevant industry recognize a standard of care
that requires the defendant to prevent emotional distress?
2. Does the legal interest involve a highly emotional
subject matter?
3. Is there a special relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant?
4. Is the occurrence of emotional distress a foreseeable
consequence of the breach?
5. Is the injury likely to be experienced by an appreciable
number of the population, as opposed to a rare,
idiosyncratic, hypersensitive or unusual minority?
6. Is the category narrowly defined to ensure
commonality?
7. Have other jurisdictions recognized a duty for that
particular category of activity?
8. Do other circumstances provide some guarantee that
claims of emotional distress will be genuine and material?
9. Do strong countervailing public policy considerations
militate against imposing a duty?
These factors are designed to reduce trivial or speculative
claims, while providing a threshold guarantee that claims of
emotional distress arising out of a protected category of activities
are genuine.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINNESOTA LAW ON NEGLIGENTLY
INFLICTED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
As in most states, Minnesota disfavors claims seeking damages
19
for emotional distress. Because psychological injury can be highly
subjective and easily feigned, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
explained that allowing recovery without an accompanying physical
injury presents the potential for speculative, trivial, exaggerated,
20
and/or contrived claims reaching a jury. Accordingly, Minnesota
19. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983)
(“Tort claims seeking damages for mental distress generally have not been favored
in Minnesota.”).
20. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560
(Minn. 1996); Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 n.3 (Minn.
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law restricts “the availability of such damages to those plaintiffs who
prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending
21
to guarantee its genuineness.”
Minnesota courts currently
22
recognize only three such circumstances. Each has roots dating
1993); see also Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 261–62, 59 N.W. 1078,
1080 (1894) (“The suffering of one under precisely the same circumstances would
be no test of the suffering of another, and there being no possible standard by
which such an injury can be even approximately measured, they are subject to
many, if not most, of the objections to speculative damages which are universally
excluded.”).
21. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438 (“Our past reluctance to provide a direct
remedy through the recognition of an independent tort reflects a policy
consideration that an independent claim of mental anguish is speculative and so
likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a considerable potential for
abuse of the judicial process.”). Minnesota law also requires that the emotional
distress be premised upon a “physical manifestation.” Leaon v. Washington Cnty.,
397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986). The threshold guarantees of trustworthiness
that justify imposing an independent duty provide a substantial basis to depart
from this archaic and rather arbitrary “physical manifestation” requirement. See
Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Me. 1987)
(“[T]he requirement of physical manifestation of mental distress was both overinclusive . . . and underinclusive . . . .” (citing Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets,
Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982))); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771
(Mo. 1983) (“[T]he requirement of physical injury resulting from the emotional
distress merely meant the replacement of one arbitrary, artificial rule with another
which was only somewhat less restrictive.”); Boorman v. Nev. Med. Cremation
Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010) (“[O]ur historical concern that emotional distress
must be demonstrated by some physical manifestation of emotional distress is not
implicated in this context. We need not question the trustworthiness of an
individual’s emotional anguish in cases involving desecration of a loved one’s
remains.”); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979) (“Advancements in modern
science lead us to . . . conclude that psychic injury is capable of being proven
despite the absence of a physical manifestation of such injury.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. g (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007) (“The requirements that the harm be serious, that the
circumstances of the case be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious
harm, and that there be credible evidence that the plaintiff has suffered such
harm better serve the purpose of screening claims than a requirement of physical
consequences.”). The physical manifestation and other requirements related to
the extent of the damages suffered are beyond the scope of this article.
22. Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d at 560 (recognizing recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress if (1) the plaintiff “suffers a physical injury as a result of
another’s negligence”; (2) the plaintiff “was actually exposed to physical harm as a
result of the negligence of another (the ‘zone-of-danger’ rule)”; and (3) where
“there has been a ‘direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that constituting
slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or
malicious conduct.’” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265
Minn. 360, 368, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963))). Although no Minnesota court has
expressly framed this as a duty issue, courts from other jurisdictions have properly
analyzed whether NIED damages can reach a jury under the rubric of the duty
analysis. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal.
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23

back over a century.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized the right to
24
recover damages for emotional distress in 1886.
It confined
recovery to “mental distress and anxiety which . . . is connected
with the bodily injury, and is fairly and reasonably the plain
25
consequence of such injury.”
Six years later, the court allowed emotional distress recovery
without a physical impact where the plaintiff suffered fright from
26
riding in a streetcar that nearly collided with a cable train. This
“zone of danger” basis of recovery has been limited over the years
to require the plaintiff to show that he or she (1) was within the
“zone of danger” of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for his
or her own safety; and (3) suffered severe emotional distress with
27
attendant physical manifestations. This basis for recovery was also
recently expanded to include a very limited bystander recovery rule
for those whose emotional distress arose out of concern for the
28
safety of others.
1993) (recognizing that there is not a duty for one to avoid negligently inflicting
emotional distress on another person in California); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d
509, 518 (Haw. 1970) (“The cases contain the broad statement that there is no
duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of mental distress. Thus the
paramount issue is characterized as one of duty: whether the plaintiff’s interest in
freedom from mental distress is entitled to legal protection from Defendant’s
conduct.” (citation omitted)); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594–96 (Tex. 1993)
(rejecting contention that there is a general duty to avoid negligently inflicting
emotional distress on others); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986)
(“[Traditionally t]here was no duty with respect to negligent acts which caused
purely mental harm where there was no impact or threat of impact upon someone
in the zone of danger.”). This general rule will be referred to herein as the “no
duty rule.”
23. See Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 137–39, 50 N.W. 1034,
1034–35 (1892) (creating the zone of danger exception); Larson v. Chase, 47
Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891) (creating the direct invasion exception);
Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 36 Minn. 290, 293, 30 N.W. 888, 889 (1886)
(creating the physical injury exception).
24. Keyes, 36 Minn. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889.
25. Id.
26. Purcell, 48 Minn. at 137–39, 50 N.W. at 1034–35. The plaintiff’s fright
resulted in convulsions, a miscarriage, and later, an illness. Id.
27. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995).
28. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 2005). In
order to recover for distress caused by fear for another’s safety, the plaintiff must
prove that he or she “(1) was in the zone of danger of physical impact; (2) had an
objectively reasonable fear for her own safety; (3) had severe emotional distress
with attendant physical manifestations; (4) stands in a close relationship to the
third-party victim”; and (5) that “the defendant’s conduct—the conduct that
created an unreasonable risk of physical injury to the plaintiff—caused serious
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Finally, in 1891 the supreme court expanded emotional
distress recovery to situations where “the act complained of
29
constitutes a violation of some legal right of the plaintiff.” As
discussed in more detail in Part IV, this “direct invasion” exception
has evolved over the years to only allow recovery in cases involving
“slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other
30
[invasions] like willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct.”
III. THE INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE
A. An Introduction to the Independent Duty Rule
In recent years, courts from across the country have soundly
criticized the traditional rule requiring proof of physical injury or
fear of physical injury before allowing compensation for emotional
distress. The most common criticism is that the physical injury rule
is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is “overinclusive in
permitting recovery for emotional distress when the suffering
accompanies or results in any physical injury whatever, no matter
how trivial,” and “underinclusive because it mechanically denies
court access to claims that may well be valid and could be proved if
31
the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial.” In addition, “from a
bodily injury to the third-party victim.” Id. at 770–71.
29. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891).
30. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 368, 122
N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963). In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals endorsed
using the pattern jury instruction for willful behavior for purposes of determining
whether the direct invasion exception has been satisfied. Gooch v. N. Country
Reg’l Hosp., No. A05-576, 2006 WL 771384, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006).
According to that instruction, “a person behaves willfully when he or she knows or
has reason to know that an act is prohibited by a policy, rule, regulation, statute, or
law and intentionally does it anyway.” Id. (citing 4 MINN. PRACTICE SERIES, JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 25.40 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp
1999)). The Gooch court also endorsed using the Black’s Law Dictionary definition
for wanton misconduct: “[A]n act, or failure to act when there is a duty to do so, in
reckless disregard of another’s rights, coupled with the knowledge that injury will
probably result.” Id. at *4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (7th ed. 1999)).
In Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996),
the supreme court declined to recognize that legal malpractice is inherently
willful, reiterating that “[t]here must be a direct violation of the plaintiff’s rights
by willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is not sufficient.” Id. at
562.
31. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980); see also
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Molien and
recognizing that “[s]uch concerns have prompted a growing number of
jurisdictions to abandon the physical injury requirement altogether”); St.
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purely practical point of view, it was proving difficult if not
impossible to separate physical injury from what was to be
32
considered purely mental and emotional reaction.” As one court
aptly observed, using artificial limitations to prohibit entire classes
of emotional distress claims “solely because some of the actions may
33
be tainted by mischief is like ‘employing a cannon to kill a flea.’”
From a historical perspective, the physical injury limitation was
created at a time when the only proof of emotional distress was the
plaintiff’s own, often self-serving, testimony. More recently, courts
are increasingly recognizing that “with ‘today’s more advanced
state of medical science, technology and testing techniques,’
evidence of physical injury [is] not necessary to adequately
34
determine whether a party [has] suffered emotional distress.”
Another court observed that “expert witnesses such as psychiatrist
[sic], psychologists and social workers are fully capable of providing
35
the jury with an analysis of a plaintiff’s emotional injuries.” As
early as 1970, the Hawaii Supreme Court also recognized these
realities and concluded that “[i]t can no longer be said that the
advantages gained by the courts in administering claims of mental
distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the burden
36
thereby imposed on the plaintiff.” Accordingly, in addition to
being arbitrary, the traditional justifications for strict physical injury
and zone of danger limitations are largely antiquated.
But, expanding emotional distress recovery involves a delicate
balance. On one hand, there is no doubt that “[c]omplete
emotional tranquillity [sic] is seldom attainable in this world, and
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of

Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987) (citing and
paraphrasing Molien), overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593
(Tex. 1993) (“Therefore, we overrule the language of Garrard to the extent that it
recognizes an independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress.”); Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?,
67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1992).
32. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Mo. 1983).
33. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Nehring v.
Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 79 (Wyo. 1978)).
34. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont. 1995)
(quoting Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (Mont. 1983)); see also Sinn
v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979) (“Advancements in modern science lead us
to . . . conclude that psychic injury is capable of being proven despite the absence
of a physical manifestation of such injury.”).
35. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991).
36. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)
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37

the price of living among people.” But at the same time, “the
human psyche can be injured in a way that is every bit as real as
38
slicing through flesh or crushing bones,” and “is as much entitled
39
to legal protection as is . . . physical well-being.” Many courts have
recognized that a narrowly defined independent duty rule strikes
an appropriate balance between these extremes, while providing
40
adequate threshold guarantees of trustworthiness.
But to say that the defendant had an independent duty is only
“‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
41
analysis in itself.’” The concept of a “‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
42
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”
Accordingly, to understand
what it means to have an independent duty to avoid causing
emotional distress, it is necessary to examine how courts have
defined the scope of the duty and the circumstances under which it
has been adopted. Approaches followed by different jurisdictions
can be loosely grouped into three categories: (1) the foreseeability
approach; (2) the special relationship approach; and (3) the
categorical approach.

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
38. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 618 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
39. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283 (Me.
1987).
40. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 (Alaska 2002) (“The
bystander and preexisting duty exceptions permit recovery for [NIED] in the
absence of physical injury because they ‘represent isolated situations where courts
have found that the special circumstances surrounding a claim for emotional
damages serve as a sufficient guarantee that the claim is neither false nor
insubstantial.’” (quoting Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202 (Alaska 1995)));
Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 205 (Wyo. 2003) (“[T]he independent
duty exception . . . is sufficiently limited in scope so as to avoid an overwhelming
burden.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 849 (2000) (“When the
defendant owes an independent duty of care to the plaintiff, there is no risk of
unlimited liability to an unlimited number of people. Liability turns solely on
relationships accepted by the defendant, usually under a contractual
arrangement.”).
41. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 332–33 (3d ed. 1964)).
42. Id.
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B. Different Formulations of the Independent Duty Rule
1.

Foreseeability Approach

A few jurisdictions recognize a duty when emotional distress
was a foreseeable consequence of the breach.
In Gammon, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court declared that
foreseeability alone “provides adequate protection against unduly
43
Using the
burdensome liability claims for emotional distress.”
classic case of mishandling a corpse as an illustration, the court
reasoned that foreseeability and genuineness of the injury go handin-hand:
Courts have concluded that the exceptional vulnerability
of the family of recent decedents makes it highly probable
that emotional distress will result from mishandling the
body. That high probability is said to provide sufficient
trustworthiness to allay the court’s fear of fraudulent
claims. This rationale, it seems, is but another way of
determining that the defendant reasonably should have
foreseen that mental distress would result from his
44
negligence.
The court found further comfort by rejecting the “eggshell”
45
plaintiff doctrine for NIED claims. According to the court, “[a]
defendant is bound to foresee psychic harm only when such harm
reasonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive
46
person.” Applying this test to the facts, it found “no sound basis to
preclude potential compensation” to the plaintiff, who suffered
emotional distress upon finding a human leg in a bag that he
believed contained his recently deceased father’s personal
47
belongings.
The North Carolina Supreme Court viewed the foreseeability
approach as striking an appropriate balance between the harshness
of the physical impact rule and the potential for abuse if recovery
43. Gammon, 534 A.2d at 1285. The court characterized the following
traditional limitations on NIED recovery as “more or less arbitrary”: proof of a
physical impact, an objective manifestation of the mental distress, an underlying
or accompanying tort, and special circumstances. Id. at 1283.
44. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See id. (“We do not foresee any great extension of tort liability by our
ruling today. We do not provide compensation for the hurt feelings of the
supersensitive plaintiff . . . .”).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1283, 1286.
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were allowed for temporary fright or disappointment. According
to the court in Johnson, damages for NIED are recoverable “if the
plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe
emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the
49
defendant’s negligence.” It explained that foreseeability is the
appropriate standard because:
If recovery is limited to instances where it would be
generally viewed as appropriate and not excessive, then,
by definition, the defendant’s liability is commensurate
with the damage that the defendant’s conduct caused.
Further, the judicial system would not be overburdened
by administering fair and proper claims. Additionally, our
trial courts have adequate means available to them for
disposing of improper claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and for adjusting excessive or
50
inadequate verdicts.
Accordingly, the Johnson court held that the mother of a stillborn
fetus properly stated a claim for NIED against her physician who
51
wrongfully caused the fetus’ death.
The Missouri Supreme Court also concluded that the
foreseeability test struck the appropriate balance between “unduly
extending liability to situations where the defendant’s acts
constitute socially desirable activity and his blame is only slight,”
and the unfairness, inequity and arbitrariness of the now52
antiquated impact rule. The court thus endorsed imposing a duty
if “the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an
53
unreasonable risk of causing the distress.” Under the particular
48. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97
(N.C. 1990). In rejecting the physical impact test and overruling a prior decision
suggesting that a physical impact was a prerequisite, the court noted that
“[c]ommon sense and precedent tell us that a defendant’s negligent act toward
one person may proximately and foreseeably cause emotional distress to another
person and justify his recovering damages, depending upon their relationship and
other factors present in the particular case.” Id. at 95.
49. Id. at 97 (emphases omitted). The Montana Supreme Court has adopted
a nearly identical test. See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411,
425 (Mont. 1995) (“A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
will arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the
plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent
act or omission.”).
50. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. Id. at 87, 99.
52. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983).
53. Id.
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facts of the case, it found that there was a fact issue for trial on
whether “these defendants could anticipate that an ordinary person
normally constituted would succumb to serious emotional distress
54
by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator.”
2.

Special Relationship Approach

A growing number of jurisdictions recognize that certain
special relationships give rise to an independent duty to avoid
55
negligently inflicting emotional distress. As a general proposition,
courts using this approach look for the existence of some special
contractual or statutory relationship involving the plaintiff’s
particular vulnerability or susceptibility to emotional distress.
56
For instance, in Burgess v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court held that recovery is allowed “in cases where a duty
57
arising from a preexisting relationship is negligently breached.”
The plaintiff sought to recover for emotional distress arising out of
58
witnessing physical injuries to her child during birth. After easily
59
finding the doctor-patient relationship created a duty of care, the
54. Id. at 773. The court suggested that evidence relevant to this question
would be the maximum period of entrapment that might reasonably be
contemplated, the method of release, and the physical hazard presented during
rescue. Id. at 773 nn.5–6.
55. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 849. (“The idea that a contractual or similar
relationship can bespeak a duty assumed by the defendant or one imposed by law
is itself of respectable lineage.”).
56. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
57. Id. at 1201. Twelve years earlier, the same court had strongly suggested
that the existence of a duty to avoid causing emotional distress is governed by a
strict foreseeability standard. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813,
816–17 (Cal. 1980) (discussing at length the role of foreseeability in the duty
analysis and finding the existence of a duty in large part because “[i]n the case at
bar the risk of harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to defendants.”). Nine
years later, the court backed away from a strict foreseeability approach, stating “it
is clear that foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful ‘guideline’ or a
meaningful restriction on the scope of the NIED action.” Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814, 826 (Cal. 1989). The Burgess court expressly overruled Molien to the
extent it purported to introduce “a new method for determining the existence of a
duty, limited only by the concept of foreseeability.” Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201.
58. See Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199.
59. Id. at 1201. The court noted that the existence of a preexisting
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant made this a “direct victim”
case, which is distinguishable from bystander cases. Id. at 1200. The major
concern in bystander cases is the possibility of exposing the tortfeasor to a limitless
class of plaintiffs, which could result in the imposition of liability out of proportion
to the culpability of the defendant. Thing, 771 P.2d at 826–27. Accordingly, like
many jurisdictions, bystander recovery in California is limited to situations where
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court focused its analysis on the scope of the duty that the
60
defendant physician owed the mother. It noted the physical and
emotional connection between a mother and her fetus:
It is in light of both these physical and emotional realities
that the obstetrician and the pregnant woman enter into a
physician-patient relationship. It cannot be gainsaid that
both parties understand that the physician owes a duty to
the pregnant woman with respect to the medical
treatment provided to her fetus. Any negligence during
delivery which causes injury to the fetus and resultant
emotional anguish to the mother, therefore, breaches a
61
duty owed directly to the mother.
Because the defendant’s negligent delivery of the plaintiff’s baby
breached a duty that he owed to both the baby and the mother, the
court explained that her “claim for emotional distress damages may
simply be viewed as an ordinary professional malpractice claim,
which seeks as an element of damage compensation for her serious
62
emotional distress.”

the plaintiff “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing
injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that
which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.” Id. at 815. The Burgess
court made clear that these limitations do not apply to direct victim cases. Burgess,
831 P.2d at 1203.
60. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1202. Later in the opinion, the court applied a multifactor balancing test to determine whether public policy considerations compel a
finding of no duty. Id. at 1205–09. This portion of the opinion is discussed in
more detail in Part V. Before conducting the balancing test, however, the court
declared that the result was predetermined because of the doctor-patient
relationship. Id. at 1205 (“Although in this case the existence of the applicable
duty is clearly established by virtue of the physician-patient relationship between
[the plaintiff and defendant], the considerations set forth above provide a
framework for our review of [the defendant’s] policy arguments against imposing
liability.”). Thus, the court treated the balancing approach as necessary only to
determine whether an exception should be made to the imposition of a duty in
doctor-patient cases involving highly emotional subjects such as childbirth. See id.
at 1205–06 (describing the mother-child relationship during pregnancy).
61. Id. at 1203.
62. Id. While generally touted as a seminal decision in this area, the Burgess
decision leaves much to be desired when attempting to apply it outside the context
of negligent childbirth because it does not clearly define what type of “preexisting
relationship” is necessary to trigger an independent duty. It is unclear, for
example, whether the court was imputing the child’s physical harm to the mother,
making a categorical exception for all medical malpractice cases, or limiting the
duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress to childbirth cases.
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An Alaska decision expanded upon the Burgess rule by
63
adopting a hybrid foreseeability/special relationship approach.
After criticizing the strict foreseeability approach, the Alaska
Supreme Court limited recovery to situations “where the defendant
64
owes the plaintiff a preexisting duty.”
Exactly what the court
meant by “preexisting duty” is unclear from the opinion, but it
found such a duty to exist where the plaintiff alleged her treating
65
physician misdiagnosed her with AIDS.
Instead of using
foreseeability as an element of the duty analysis, the court held that
the scope of the physician’s duty is to “refrain from activity which
presented a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of causing
66
emotional distress.”
After taking judicial notice of the
“unquestionable” “significance of a false imputation of AIDS,” it
held that this allegation was sufficient to present a fact issue for the
jury on the foreseeability and seriousness of the plaintiff’s
67
emotional distress.
A Texas court has also endorsed a hybrid foreseeability/special
relationship test that imposes a duty when emotional distress is “a
foreseeable result of a breach of a duty arising out of certain
68
‘special relationships.’”
The Texas Court of Appeals aptly
observed that “[s]pecial relationship cases generally have three
common elements: (1) a contractual relationship between the
parties, (2) a particular susceptibility to emotional distress on the
part of the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the
plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to the emotional distress, based
69
on the circumstances.” Applying this test, the court found that a
special relationship existed between a county medical examiner’s
office and the father of a recently deceased young child where the
defendant had a statutory obligation to perform an autopsy, but
63. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995).
64. Id. The extent of the court’s criticism of the strict foreseeability approach
was “[w]e do not believe that the traditional tort principle of foreseeability,
standing alone, properly defines the scope of a defendant’s duty in an action for
damages for negligently inflected emotional distress.” Id. The court was also
careful to note that “a plaintiff may recover for only ‘severe’ or ‘serious’ emotional
distress.” Id. at 204.
65. Id. at 203.
66. Id. at 205. The impact of this distinction is that foreseeability becomes a
question for the jury, not the court. Id.
67. Id.
68. Freeman v. Harris Cnty., 183 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App. 2006) (citing
Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 1997)).
69. Id.
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70

lost the child’s body.
71
In Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, the Oregon Supreme
Court provided a somewhat more helpful explanation as to when
emotional distress damages are recoverable in the context of
72
special relationships. According to the court, the duty to avoid a
specific type of harm is driven by the standard of care in that
particular industry:
[W]here the standard of care in a particular medical
profession recognizes the possibility of adverse
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical
concern and dictates that certain precautions be taken to
avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate persons in
that profession from liability if they fail in those duties,
73
thereby causing the contemplated harm.
Later Oregon decisions clarified that an industry standard to
74
avoid emotional harm is not, in itself, determinative. Rather, “the
legally protected interest so identified must be of sufficient
importance to warrant the award of damages for emotional
distress,” such as certain types of special relationships between the
75
plaintiff and the defendant. Instead of declaring the existence of
special relationships on a categorical basis (e.g., all doctor-patient
70. Id. Although the plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the
defendant, the court noted that the statutory duty was a sufficient substitute. Id.
The statute at issue required the defendant medical examiner to conduct an
autopsy on “a child who is younger than six years of age and the death is reported
under Chapter 264, Family Code,” which governs child protective services. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.25 § 6(a)(7). In an earlier, highly controversial
decision, the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize that an intimate sexual
relationship gives rise to a special relationship because there was no “specific duty
of care that, under the law, arises from the relationship.” Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1993). Thus the Boyles court refused to allow the plaintiff to
recover for mental suffering when her companion surreptitiously videotaped their
sexual relations and distributed it to persons in her social network. Id.
Accordingly, absent a contractual relationship, the statutory duty in Freeman was
probably necessary for the imposition of a duty.
71. 956 P.2d 960 (Or. 1998).
72. See id. at 963.
73. Id.
74. Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 770 (Or. Ct. App.
2005).
75. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to
the Oregon Court of Appeals in another case, “the critical inquiry becomes
whether the kind of interest invaded is of sufficient importance as a matter of
policy to merit protection from emotional impact.” Bennett v. Baugh, 961 P.2d
883, 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (cittion omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 985 P.2d 1282 (1999).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/7

16

Ehrich: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Case for an Indepen

1418

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

relationships), Oregon law requires the court to examine the
particular facts of each case and determine whether “the parties
construct[ed] an essentially fiduciary-type relationship” such that
“the party who owe[d] the duty has a special responsibility toward
76
the other party.”
Using this framework, Oregon courts have
found protected special relationships to exist, for example,
77
between a patient and his doctor performing an MRI scan and
between a twenty-four-hour boarding school and a suicidal
78
student.
Iowa law focuses on the emotional nature of the relationship
to determine whether it qualifies as a special relationship.
Accordingly, there is a duty to avoid emotional distress where the
defendant performs an act that is
so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude,
or with the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is
owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, and it
should be known to the parties from the nature of the
[obligation] that such suffering will result from its
79
breach.
The Iowa Supreme Court has further explained that foreseeability
is an “important factor for consideration in the determination of
80
the existence of a duty.” Using this framework, Iowa courts have

76. Shin, 111 P.3d at 771 (citation omitted); see also Strader v. Grange Mut.
Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 903, 906 (Or. 2002) (“[T]he cases establish a functional as
opposed to a formal analysis in determining whether the special relationship
exists; in other words, the crucial aspect of the relationship is not its name, but the
roles that the parties assume in the particular interaction where the alleged tort
and breach of contract occur.”).
77. Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs.II, 956 P.2d 960, 963 (Or. 1998). The
plaintiff in Curtis stated a valid cause of action by alleging that “the defendants
were medical professionals who owed a duty to plaintiff to identify and guard
against predictable psychological reactions or consequences—including
claustrophobic reactions—to the MRI procedure.” Id.
78. Shin, 111 P.3d at 773. The standard of care that the court identified
required a “reasonably prudent boarding school-surrogate parent [to] recognize[]
the possibility of grave emotional distress as a concern associated with handling a
suicidal teenage student in the school’s custody and dictates that certain
precautions be taken to avoid or minimize such risks.” Id. at 772.
79. Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 921 (Iowa 1976). Iowa further
requires that the degree of emotional distress suffered be “so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Bethards v. Shivvers, Inc., 355
N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa 1984).
80. Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Iowa 1995) (citing Barnhill v.
Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981)).
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found special relationships to exist in actions involving the
81
negligent delivery of a baby, the negligent delivery of a telegram
82
announcing the death of a loved one, and the negligent
83
performance of a contract to perform funeral services, but not for
84
committing legal malpractice.
The Nevada Supreme Court recently concluded that two
different defendants accused of committing the exact same act owe
85
different duties because of the nature of the relationship involved.
In Boorman, either the defendant county coroner or the defendant
86
mortuary lost a body’s internal organs. According to the Boorman
court, “[u]nlike the duty of a county coroner . . . a mortuary
voluntarily undertakes a duty to competently prepare the
87
decedent’s body for the benefit of the bereaved.” Accordingly,
“close family members who are aware of both the death of a loved
one and that mortuary services were being performed may bring an
action for emotional distress resulting from the negligent handling
88
of the deceased’s remains” against a mortuary. A county coroner,
however, “is obligated by law to perform [those] services,” “does
not create a special relationship,” and does not “undertake any
particular duty to the bereaved to prepare the deceased’s body for
89
funeral services.” Accordingly, a county coroner only has a duty to
“the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body for
90
negligently handling a deceased person’s remains.”

81. Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1990). The Oswald court
suggested that negligent delivery cases will almost always support a duty to avoid
inflicting emotional distress. Id. (“As we observed by way of analogy in Meyer, the
birth of a child involves a matter of life and death evoking such ‘mental concern
and solicitude’ that the breach of a contract incident thereto ‘will inevitably result
in mental anguish, pain and suffering.’” (quoting Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 920)).
82. Cowan v. W. Union Tel. Co., 98 N.W. 281, 282–84 (Iowa 1904).
83. Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 920–21.
84. Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d at 423. The court reasoned that (1) legal work “is
not so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the feelings
of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering;” and (2) “the claimed emotional
distress is too far removed from the defendants’ negligent conduct to cause the
imposition of a duty and does not naturally ensue from the acts complained of.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
85. Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8–9 (Nev. 2010).
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id.
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Some courts have attempted to more clearly define the
parameters of a “special” or “preexisting” relationship by using
what essentially amounts to a negligence per se analysis. In Clomon
91
v. Monroe City School Board, the Louisiana Supreme Court framed
the independent duty rule as “permitting recovery for emotional
distress from a tortfeasor who owed the plaintiff a special, direct
92
duty created by law, contract or special relationship.”
The
plaintiff, a motorist who struck and killed a four-year-old child who
had just exited a school bus, sued the bus driver and school board
for the driver’s negligent failure to “await the safe passage of the
child and to refrain from prematurely deactivating the signals or
93
resuming her trip” in violation of Louisiana statute. While not
expressly defining the scope or limitations on what constitutes a
“special, direct duty,” the court suggested that any statutory
violation satisfying the requirements of a negligence per se analysis
94
would qualify.
In addition, although the court did not make
foreseeability an express requirement, it noted that a bus driver
who breaches the statutory duty to keep bus signals on until exiting
children reach safety could reasonably foresee that a passing
95
motorist may strike a child and suffer resulting emotional distress.
Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court found legislative intent
important in allowing recovery for emotional distress “under the
theory that there has been a breach of fiduciary duty arising from
the very special psychotherapist-patient confidential relationship
recognized and created under section 491.0147 of the Florida
96
Statutes.”
That statute required psychotherapists to keep the
91. 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990).
92. Id. at 575.
93. Id. at 577.
94. See id. at 576 (“To determine whether Sonya established that the school
board employees owed her a special, direct duty that they breached, entitling her
to recover emotional distress damages caused by the violations, we follow a
method similar to that of determining whether a defendant may be held liable in a
negligence case on the basis of his violation of a statute.”). As to how a passing
motorist is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, the
court broadly recognized that “the motorist is required and entitled to rely for his
safety, convenience and peace of mind upon the bus driver’s performance of his
duty to activate highly visible signals, await the child’s safe passage and remain as a
stationary sentinel until the child’s security is clearly assured.” Id. at 578.
95. Id. at 578 (“It is obvious that the bus driver’s dereliction may result in
minimal to extreme consequences for the motorist including his fright at a near
miss, his own physical injury or property damage, or his serious emotional and
mental illness associated with a child’s injury or death . . . .”).
96. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 352 (Fla. 2002). The court also found it
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substance of patient communications confidential.
Without
defining the scope of this special relationship exception to
Florida’s traditional impact rule, the court held that a married
couple could recover for emotional distress resulting from their
marital counselor revealing “confidential information which the
98
other spouse had told him in their private sessions.” A New York
court also recognized the validity of a similar NIED claim against a
psychotherapist after emphasizing the fiduciary and confidential
nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and acknowledging that
“the several statutes and regulations requiring physicians to protect
the confidentiality of information gained during treatment are
99
clear evidence of the public policy of New York.”
Finally, a relatively early Maine court decision made explicit
what is implicit in each of these other decisions; that is, the nature
of, and circumstances surrounding, certain special relationships
make the traditional rationales for NIED denying recovery
inapplicable:
The rationale for requiring an independently actionable
tort is that absent either tactile contact or the usual indicia
of harm, no objective evidence exists that the defendant’s
negligence actually has caused the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress. There is little likelihood, however,
that objective evidence of mental distress will be
unavailable in a claim by a patient against his
psychotherapist. Given the fact that a therapist undertakes
the treatment of a patient’s mental problems and that the
patient is encouraged to divulge his innermost thoughts,
the patient is extremely vulnerable to mental harm if the
therapist fails to adhere to the standards of care
recognized by the profession. Any psychological harm
that may result from such negligence is neither
speculative nor easily feigned. Unlike evidence of mental
distress occurring in other situations, objective proof of
the existence vel non of a psychological injury in these
important that the legislature has “declared for the people of Florida that
‘emotional survival is equal in importance to physical survival.’” Id. (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 491.002 (2001)).
97. FLA. STAT. § 491.0147 (1997). Florida generally follows the “impact rule,”
but the court held that “under the particular facts of the case before us,” this rule
did not accommodate the intent and purpose of section 491.0147. Gracey, 837 So.
2d at 351, 355, 358.
98. Id. at 351.
99. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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circumstances should not be difficult to obtain. As this
case illustrates, the severity of such an injury can be
medically significant and objectively supportable. We
therefore conclude that the reasons for precluding
100
recovery for mental distress are not cogent here.
Rowe involved a defendant who provided psychotherapy to
both the plaintiff and a woman with whom the plaintiff was
101
After a few months, the defendant
romantically involved.
allegedly terminated therapy with the plaintiff because she had
developed “some emotional feelings” toward the plaintiff’s partner,
102
which later developed into a romantic relationship. The plaintiff
presented testimony that the defendant “failed to adhere to the
basic standards applicable to a psycho-therapist when she
continued to treat the plaintiff after [the defendant] became
involved in a relationship with the plaintiff’s primary
103
companion.”
Accordingly, the court held that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship created a duty to avoid causing
104
emotional distress.
3.

The Categorical Approach

Instead of trying to articulate a universal test applicable to all
factual situations, the Third Restatement approaches the
independent duty rule on a categorical basis:
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious
emotional disturbance to another is subject to liability to
the other if the conduct:
....
(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious
105
emotional disturbance.

100. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 806–07 (Me. 1986).
101. Id. at 803.
102. Id. at 803–04.
103. Id. at 804.
104. See id. (“Accordingly Bennett, as a qualified social worker who undertook
treatment of the plaintiff, and DHRS, as Bennett’s employer and supervisor, were
under a duty to provide care in accordance with the standards of practice
applicable to similar professionals engaged in counseling and psychotherapy.”).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
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The Third Restatement identifies several categories of activities
for which courts have traditionally allowed recovery, but declines to
take a position on which specific activities, undertakings, or
106
relationships should support a duty.
While the Third
Restatement does not offer guidelines for determining when
categories are appropriate for protection, it does observe that
independent duty cases generally involve an undertaking or
relationship “in which serious emotional harm is likely or where
one person is in a position of power or authority over the other and
107
therefore has greater potential to inflict emotional harm.” In this
regard, the Third Restatement seems to be endorsing the general
policy considerations underlying the special relationship approach,
while acknowledging that a single test for determining the
existence of a special relationship has not yet been satisfactorily
108
annunciated. The Third Restatement further acknowledges what
the preceding summary of cases demonstrate: (1) this is a
109
developing area of law; (2) “[c]ourts have not provided clear
guidelines to identify precisely which activities, undertakings, or
110
relationships will support liability;”
and (3) there is little
111
consensus among courts on how to identify proper categories.
The Third Restatement’s position on the duty element in
emotional distress cases is essentially the inverse of its position on
the duty element in cases involving physical injury. According to
section 7(a), “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical
112
harm.”
Under this rule, courts generally “need not concern
113
themselves with the existence or content of this ordinary duty” on
a case-by-case basis as long as the actor’s conduct created a risk of
106. Id. at cmt. d. The comment highlights cases involving erroneous death
notifications, mishandling of a corpse or body remains, consumption of food
contaminated with “repulsive foreign objects,” negligent childbirth, and
misdiagnosis of a serious disease. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at cmt. f. The comments to Section 46(b) specifically reject the
foreseeability approach for its overbreadth. See id. For example, they illustrate
why foreseeability alone is undesirable: “[A] doctor who negligently (and
incorrectly) diagnoses a popular movie star or professional athlete as having
terminal cancer is not liable to the star’s fans who suffer emotional disturbance
upon hearing the diagnosis, even though such harm is clearly foreseeable.” Id.
109. See id. at cmt. d.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 7(a) (2010).
113. Id. § 6 cmt. f.
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114

physical harm.
The narrow exception is where “an articulated
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
115
liability in a particular class of cases.” In such “exceptional cases,”
the court should make a categorical exception “explained and
justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify
exempting [such] actors from liability or modifying the ordinary
116
duty of reasonable care.”
In emotional distress cases, however,
section 47(b) embraces a general rule that there is no duty to avoid
negligently inflicting emotional distress on others, but courts are
allowed to make categorical exceptions where public policy
117
considerations justify imposing liability.
Although few cases have overtly adopted the categorical
approach, the rationales provided in several cases clearly indicate
that is what the courts were doing. For instance, in La Fleur v.
118
Mosher, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that, although
there is generally no duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional
distress, an exception should be made for negligent confinement
cases because the tort “by its very nature has the special likelihood
119
of causing real and severe emotional distress.” The court went on
to explain that:
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7(b). The Third Restatement provides several examples of where
courts have identified important public policy considerations opposing the
existence of a duty, including cases where courts held that (1) mothers owe no
duty to their unborn fetuses; (2) physicians owe no duty to third parties; (3) social
hosts who serve liquor owe no duty to third parties injured by their guests; and (4)
certain media defendants owe no duty to protect the public from physical harm
due to publishing material such as video games, books, and movies. Id. at cmts. c,
d & cmt. e reporters’ note.
116. Id. at cmt. j.
117. See id. § 46 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“[T]he rules stated in this
Section and in § 47 are exceptions to a general rule that negligently caused pure
emotional disturbance is not recoverable even when it is foreseeable.”).
118. 325 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1982).
119. Id. at 317. That is not to say, however, that Wisconsin’s categorical
exception means a duty will be imposed every time that a defendant’s conduct falls
within a recognized category. The La Fleur court went on to hold that plaintiffs
with a negligent confinement action must prove five factors:
(1) The defendant must have been negligent in confining the plaintiff.
(2) The confinement must be for a substantial period of time.
(3) The circumstances surrounding the confinement must be such that a
reasonably constituted person would be emotionally harmed.
(4) The confinement must be a substantial factor in causing the
emotional distress.
(5) The resulting emotional distress must be severe.
Id. at 318.
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By the very fact of confinement, under facts like those set
forth here, a person’s right to be free from bodily
restraint is infringed. This deprivation of liberty alone,
when it causes serious emotional distress, is a wrong
sufficiently worthy of redress that the physical injury
requirement should not be necessary. When there is a
substantial and unwarranted deprivation of liberty, that
deprivation itself is a sufficient guarantee that the claim is
not frivolous and that it is more probable that the plaintiff
did, in fact, suffer the emotional distress alleged. It is the
very nature of confinement that creates the likelihood of
emotional injury. Emotional harm, in the appropriate
circumstances, is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
120
negligent confinement.
It is unclear whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court will use this
121
analysis to create other categorical exceptions.
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted negligent
mishandling of corpses as a narrow exception to the general rule of
122
no recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The only
rationale provided was the long history of courts recognizing a
“‘quasi-property’ right in the survivors to control the disposition of
123
a loved one’s remains.”
The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized the flexibility of
the categorical approach, noting that “the law of mental anguish
damages is rooted in societal judgments, some no longer current,
124
about the gravity of certain wrongs and their likely effects.” The
categorical approach, according to the court, arose in part out of
125
the impossibility of “distilling a unified theory of mental anguish,”
but recognized “that there are some categories of cases in which
the problems of foreseeability and genuineness are sufficiently
126
mitigated that the law should allow recovery for anguish.”
The
only categories that the court mentioned were “intentional or

120. Id. at 317–18 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court cited foreseeability as a public policy factor supporting a categorical
exception, not as a stand-alone basis to impose a duty. Id. at 318.
121. See M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining
to speculate whether Wisconsin would expand La Fleur).
122. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 462–63 (W.
Va. 1985).
123. Id. at 460–61.
124. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 1997).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 495.
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malicious conduct such as libel” and “violations of certain statutes
127
such as the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.” It declined to adopt a
new category for the flooding of one’s home and destruction of
128
personal items.
Absent from the foregoing authorities is any useful framework
for determining when a particular category should be recognized.
This absence exposes these decisions to criticism for being resultoriented and generating unpredictability and uncertainty. Several
jurisdictions attempt to address these problems by using a multifactor test that takes into account
(1)The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(2)The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury;
(3)The closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered;
(4)The moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct;
(5)The policy of preventing future harm;
(6)The extent of the burden to the defendant;
(7)The consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach;
and
(8)The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
129
the risk involved.
Applying this test, courts have found an independent duty to
130
exist in categories of cases involving babies switched at birth and
131
babies injured during delivery, but declined to recognize an
independent duty in categories of cases involving product
manufacturers that fail to warn strict ethical vegans of the presence
132
of animal products in their products
and defendants who
negligently place the plaintiff in a position to unknowingly harm a
127. Id. (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 496–97. The court reasoned that not everyone suffering this injury
would be likely to suffer emotional distress or feel undercompensated by receiving
the monetary value of their destroyed property. Id. at 497.
129. Friedman v. Merck & Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 891 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); accord Kallstrom v.
United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 n.24 (Alaska 2002) (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N.
Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981)); Burgess v. Superior
Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Cal. 1992); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196,
203–04 (Wyo. 2003).
130. Larsen, 81 P.3d at 206–07.
131. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1205.
132. Friedman, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892.
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133

third party.
More can be gleaned from the cases that reject an
independent duty using this balancing test than those that
recognize one.
For instance, the defendant in Friedman negligently
misrepresented to the plaintiff that a tuberculosis test was “vegan
134
safe,” meaning it contained no animal byproducts. The plaintiff
commenced suit when he discovered that the test actually involved
injecting him with bovine (cow) serum, which offended his ethical
belief that animals should not be exploited for any purpose and
135
allegedly caused him emotional distress.
The court found it
dispositive that its task was
[N]ot to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was
reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s
conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether
the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that
liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent
136
party.
Because strict ethical vegans do not constitute an “appreciable or
substantial” portion of the population, the court determined that
“public policy does not support the imposition of a duty to warn or
137
advise.”
Moving from cases where the class size is too small, an Alaska
decision illustrates how a class size can be too large. The defendant
in Kallstrom negligently allowed someone to leave a pitcher of lye138
based caustic detergent near a kitchen sink. Believing the pitcher
contained fruit juice, the plaintiff poured a cup for a child to drink,
139
which caused the child severe internal injuries.
The plaintiff
brought suit for the emotional distress she suffered in knowing that
140
she harmed the child.
Because the “[f]actual circumstances
creating the participant or unwitting instrument scenario can vary
so widely,” the court was concerned that such a classification did
133. Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 168.
134. Friedman, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888–89.
135. Id. at 889.
136. Id. at 891 (citing Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n.6 (Cal. 1986)).
137. Id. at 892, 894. The court cited a long line of cases for the proposition
“that there is no duty to warn of the possibility of rare, idiosyncratic,
hypersensitive, or unusual reactions to an otherwise safe and useful product.” Id.
at 892.
138. Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 164.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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not provide “a sufficient guarantee that the claim is neither false
141
The court explained how the breadth of the
nor insubstantial.”
proposed category undermined the “first and most important
factor, foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff”:
We can imagine a potentially endless variety of factual
circumstances that may give rise to an unwitting
instrument claim: the friend who mails a defective toy to a
child who later chokes on a small part of the toy, the
owner who lends his car to a friend unaware that the car
has faulty brakes, the cook whose customers develop a
disease ten years after he served them food containing a
carcinogenic preservative, and the driver who sues parents
for negligent supervision after hitting a child who chases a
ball into the street. Although all might be labeled
“unwitting instruments,” these scenarios vary widely with
regard to the relevant considerations of duty, including
foreseeability, certainty of injury, and ability to prevent
142
future harm.
The court went on to cite other potentially problematic variables
inherent in this type of category, including “the relationship
between the plaintiff and the victim, the nature of the participant’s
involvement, and the uncertain mix of potential emotions,
143
including guilt, shock or indifference.”
IV. A CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE IN MINNESOTA
A. Suitability of an Independent Duty Rule Under Minnesota Law
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has been reluctant “to
144
expand the availability of damages for emotional distress,” it has
endorsed recovery where “the emotional injury occurred under
145
circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.” Minnesota
law thus does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of recognizing
a narrowly tailored independent duty to avoid negligently inflicting
146
emotional distress.
141. Id. at 167.
142. Id. (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554,
555 (Alaska 1981)).
143. Id. at 168.
144. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560
(Minn. 1996).
145. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983).
146. See also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in
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Neither the special relationship nor the foreseeability
formulations of the independent duty rule, however, appear to
satisfy the criteria for NIED recovery in Minnesota. When
formulating rules for NIED recovery, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has emphasized the need for a bright-line test that is
147
“workable, reasonable, logical and just as possible.” An objective
test is “necessary to ensure stability and predictability in the
148
None of the foreign
disposition of emotional distress claims.”
decisions falling within the special relationship approach have
successfully outlined a useful test for determining when a
qualifying special relationship exists, let alone articulated a bright149
line rule.
And the Minnesota Supreme Court has already
rejected a similar version of the foreseeability test for bystander
recovery, criticizing it as being too subjective, too expansive, and
150
not conducive to a precise definition.
Many courts from other
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1993). After discussing Minnesota’s
NIED decisions, Professor Steenson discusses the special relationship rule
announced in Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992), and notes
that “the possibility still exists for the Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt the
Burgess approach, even if it adheres to the basic zone of danger/physical
formulation as the standard for resolving negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases.” Steenson, supra, at 31. He concludes that if Minnesota courts liberalize the
zone of danger requirement in “direct victim” cases such as Burgess, courts would
be permitted “to analyze the issue of whether recovery should be granted by using
the same policy factors used to analyze duty cases in general.” Id. at 22.
147. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980). The Stadler court
explained that “[i]f the limits cannot be consistently and meaningfully applied by
courts and juries, then the imposition of liability would become arbitrary and
capricious,” and “the cause of just apportionment of the losses would suffer.” Id.
at 554.
148. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995). The plaintiff in
K.A.C. was exposed to a risk of AIDS when the defendant performed two
gynecological procedures on her while he was infected with HIV. Id. at 555. The
court held that a mere fear of exposure failed to satisfy the zone of danger
requirement because it would impart subjectivity into the analysis. Id. at 559.
149. See supra Part III.B.2.
150. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 n.3 (Minn. 2005);
Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554–55. According to the Engler court, bystander tests in
other jurisdictions fall into three categories: (1) the impact rule; (2) the zone of
danger test; and (3) the foreseeable bystander test. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 768.
The foreseeable bystander test allows recovery where “‘the plaintiff: (1) is closely
related to the [third-party] victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injuryproducing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to
the victim’; and ‘(3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness.’” Id. at 769 n.2 (quoting Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989)). Stadler expressly rejected this test. Stadler,
295 N.W.2d at 554–55. The Engler court observed that some jurisdictions have
adopted a variation of this test that looks solely to the foreseeability of the harm.
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jurisdictions have also soundly criticized the foreseeability
151
approach for its vagueness, unpredictability, and subjectivity.
The categorical approach, on the other hand, is more
cautious, far less arbitrary than the existing limits on NIED
recovery, and can be as narrow as courts wish to make it. Further,
once qualifying categories are adopted, the approach results in
objective, bright-line rules that are easy to apply. Perhaps most
importantly, the categorical approach is more consistent with
Minnesota’s direct invasion exception and better serves to
reconcile cases that have allowed recovery with those that have not.
An examination of the roots and evolution of Minnesota’s direct
invasion exception illuminates these advantages.
B. The Tortured Evolution of Minnesota’s Direct Invasion Exception
152

In the seminal 1891 decision, Larson v. Chase, the Minnesota
Supreme Court examined whether a woman could recover for
“mental suffering and nervous shock” for the defendant’s “unlawful
153
mutilation and dissection” of her husband’s body. The court first
examined cases from other jurisdictions and concluded that “all
courts now concur in holding that the right to the possession of a
dead body for the purposes of decent burial belongs to those most
intimately and closely connected with the deceased by domestic
ties, and that this is a right which the law will recognize and

Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 770 n.3. Engler expressly rejected this test as being even
more expansive because it “is not cabined by the imposition of mandatory
elements, such as a close relationship or contemporaneous observation.” Id. at
770 n.3.
151. E.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 826 (“[I]t is clear that foreseeability of the injury
alone is not a useful ‘guideline’ or a meaningful restriction on the scope of the
NIED action.”); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. 1996) (“[The
foreseeability approach] provides little, if any, concrete guidelines for trial courts
and juries to use in deciding how each case should be resolved.”); Boyles v. Kerr,
855 S.W.2d 593, 599–600 (Tex. 1993) (“[The foreseeability] standard, however,
fails to delineate meaningfully those situations where recovery should be
allowed.”); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (“Unfortunately
[the foreseeability] test is so vague that it has little practical value.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46(b)
cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“Instead of relying on foreseeability to
identify appropriate cases for recovery, the policy issues surrounding specific
categories of undertakings, activities, and relationships must be examined to
determine whether, as a category, they merit inclusion among the exceptions to
the general rule of no liability.”).
152. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
153. Id. at 307, 50 N.W. at 238.
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154

protect.”
In holding that recovery for emotional distress is
permitted under these circumstances, the court broadly declared
that “where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement on a legal
right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is the direct,
155
proximate, and natural result of the wrongful act.” The court did
156
not limit this proclamation to willful or wanton conduct.
157
In Bucknam v. Great Northern Railway Co., the Minnesota
Supreme Court emphasized that Larson is limited to situations
158
involving a direct violation of an underlying legal interest.
The
plaintiff sought recovery for emotional distress because she had
witnessed the defendant use “harsh, violent, and abusive language,
and ma[k]e threatening and insulting demands of and towards
159
plaintiff’s husband.”
The court quickly dispensed with her
argument because she was not able to identify “any infraction of
160
her legal right.” The court further explained that:
Many vexatious, annoying, and humiliating things
frequently occur in every community that are not
actionable. Such things may affect those peculiarly
sensitive, while to others they would seem only a matter of
indifference. The latter, unaffected thereby, could not
maintain an action for a personal wrong; and, if the
former should be permitted to do so, we should have
litigated a question of comparative nervousness and
sensitiveness as an element of damages, and the courts
burdened with vexatious litigation where there was
neither slander, physical injury, negligence, or intent to
injure or frighten a third person, and where the
defendant might be entirely unaware of the physical
161
condition of the person so alleged to be injured.

154. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238–39.
155. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239–40.
156. See id. The opinion does not describe enough facts to understand the
level of the defendant’s culpability. The fact that he was accused of “mutilation”
and “dissection” is suggestive of morbid intentional misconduct, but it is equally
possible the defendant was a mortician or coroner acting under the mistaken
belief that an autopsy was authorized. In either event, the court did not focus on
the defendant’s culpability in any way in allowing recovery.
157. 76 Minn. 373, 79 N.W. 98 (1899).
158. Id. at 377, 79 N.W. at 99.
159. Id. at 376, 79 N.W. at 98.
160. Id. at 377, 79 N.W. at 99.
161. Id.
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In 1894, the supreme court refused to extend Larson to allow
recovery for mental suffering resulting from negligently failing to
162
deliver a telegram.
The plaintiff in Francis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co. sent a telegram to his estranged wife asking if she
163
When she did not respond,
wished to reconcile their marriage.
the plaintiff “concluded that she was unwilling to renew her
marriage relations with him, and feared that all hope of
164
reconciliation with her was at an end.”
When the plaintiff
discovered that his wife did not respond because she had never
received the telegram, he brought suit claiming the telegraph
165
company was responsible for causing his emotional distress.
Even though the defendant had violated a state statute in
failing to transmit the telegram, and even though the statute
specifically authorized the plaintiff to recover all actual damages
sustained as a result of that failure, the supreme court
characterized the gravamen of the action as being for a breach of
166
contract, not a tort.
Because the plaintiff’s action was not
possible without the existence of a contract, the court limited the
plaintiff to contract damages, which does not include damages for
167
emotional distress.
The court explained why emotional distress
damages are disfavored:
The law has always been exceedingly cautious in allowing
damages for mental suffering, for the manifest reasons,
among others, that such damages are more sentimental
than substantial, depending largely upon temperament
and physical and nervous condition. The suffering of one
under precisely the same circumstances would be no test
of the suffering of another, and there being no possible
standard by which such an injury can be even
approximately measured, they are subject to many, if not
most, of the objections to speculative damages which are
universally excluded. In no case will an action for
damages lie for mental suffering caused by an act which,
168
however wrongful, infringes no legal right of the party.

162.
(1894).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 266, 59 N.W. 1078, 1082
Id. at 258, 59 N.W. at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 261, 59 N.W. at 1080.
See id. at 261–64, 59 N.W. at 1080–81.
Id. at 261–62, 59 N.W. at 1080.
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The court then distinguished Larson as involving: (1) a willful tort,
not a pure contract action; and (2) circumstances that “naturally
169
and necessarily [tend] to injure the feelings.”
170
In Lindh v. Great Northern Railway Co., the court shifted its
focus back to the plaintiff’s legal interest, and cited Larson as being
dispositive to the question of whether a widow could recover for
her emotional distress resulting from the defendant “carelessly and
negligently” leaving his dead wife’s coffin exposed to rain while
171
transporting it in a railroad truck.
The opinion also mentions
that the defendant “willfully ignored the request of the plaintiff to
172
but does not mention the
place the truck under cover,”
defendant’s culpability as being important or even relevant to the
173
outcome.
Instead, the court hinted for the first time that the
nature of the undertaking (i.e., handling dead bodies) imparted
some inherent reliability to an allegation of emotional distress:
“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring as naturally
from disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the
174
elements as by dissection.” The decision does not cite Francis or
make any distinction between pure contract actions and actions for
willful torts.
One year after Lindh, the court again shifted the focus back to
the Francis court’s contract/tort distinction. Like Larson and Lindh,
175
Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co., involved a rail carrier
delivering a damaged corpse, but with one important distinction.
Instead of the rail carrier causing the damage, it neglected to
unload the body at the proper station, which delayed the funeral
169. Id. at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080. The court later suggested that it is never
proper in pure breach of contract actions (i.e., contract actions that do not involve
willful conduct) to distinguish between contracts that are merely pecuniary in
nature, and those that are emotional in nature. Id. at 264, 59 N.W. at 1081. The
court emphasized the danger of creating a slippery slope if mental distress
damages were allowed in certain breach of contract actions but not others. See id.
170. 99 Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823 (1906).
171. Id. at 408, 109 N.W. at 823–24.
172. Id. at 408, 109 N.W. at 823.
173. See id. at 408–10, 109 N.W. at 823–24. Nor did the court mention the fact
that the plaintiff could not have proved her case without the existence of an
underlying contractual obligation to ship the corpse, a consideration that the
Francis court found dispositive. See id.
174. Id. at 409, 109 N.W. at 824. In mentioning “exposure” and “dissection,”
the court was referring to the facts of the case (exposing the corpse to the
elements) and the facts in Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 308, 50 N.W. 238, 238
(1891) (dissecting the body).
175. 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
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for twenty-four hours and gave the corpse additional time to decay
176
naturally. The court began by observing generally that emotional
distress damages are “limited to actions where the plaintiff has
received some injury to his person, or some legal right has been
177
invaded of a nature naturally to cause grief and distress of mind.”
But the court went on to explain that this rule only applies to tort
actions, and that failing to timely deliver a corpse to a funeral,
178
without more, was really just a breach of contract. Accordingly, if
an action is based purely upon a breach of contract, the plaintiff
has to show that the breach was willful in order to recover damages
179
for emotional distress. The court distinguished Larson and Lindh
180
as both involving willful conduct.
In 1940, the supreme court transitioned back to focusing on
the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal interest, again without
181
mentioning the defendant’s culpability. In Sworski v. Simons, an
undertaker acting at the direction of the county coroner began
182
embalming the plaintiff’s son’s body without his permission.
Relying heavily on Larson, the court focused on the plaintiff’s legal
right to his son’s body and the accompanying right to determine
who would perform the embalming, not on any willful or wanton
183
misconduct by the defendant. The opinion makes no mention of
any wrongful act other than negligence, and does not cite Francis or
Beaulieu.
Although seemingly inconsistent, these “direct invasion”
decisions can be reconciled as allowing emotional distress damages
in certain emotionally-charged tort actions and contract actions
involving a willful breach. In 1963, however, the supreme court in

176. Id. at 48, 114 N.W. at 353.
177. Id. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353.
178. See id. at 52–53, 114 N.W. at 355. In an action for breach of contract, the
court explained that the only recoverable damages are those “within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and which may be
measured and determined by some definite rule or standard of compensation.”
Id. Because damages for emotional distress are “incapable of definite calculation,”
they can be recovered in a breach of contract action only “in those exceptional
cases where the breach amounts to an independent willful tort, in which event
they may be recovered under proper allegations of malice, wantonness, or
oppression.” Id.
179. Id. at 55–56, 114 N.W. at 356.
180. Id.
181. 208 Minn. 201, 293 N.W. 309 (1940).
182. Id. at 203, 293 N.W. at 310.
183. See id. at 205, 293 N.W. at 311.
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle, perhaps
inadvertently blurred this distinction when attempting to
summarize these decisions in a single sentence:
It is well established that damages for mental anguish or
suffering cannot be sustained where there has been no
accompanying physical injury unless there has been some
conduct on the part of [the] defendant constituting a
direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution,
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious
185
misconduct.
The result was a confusing and inaccurate synthesis of the direct
invasion decisions that does not fully effectuate the Larson court’s
holding that “where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement
on a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is the
186
direct, proximate and natural result of the wrongful act.”
In addition, the Village of Isle court’s characterization of the
direct invasion exception was unnecessary for the outcome of the
decision because the plaintiff only alleged a derivative injury
(mental distress arising out of the death of another), not a direct
187
Accordingly, her emotional
invasion of her own legal interest.
distress damages should have been denied summarily based upon
188
Bucknam and Larson.
In this regard, the Village of Isle court
committed the same error that the Larson court chastised other
courts for making:
There has been a great deal of misconception and
confusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering, as a
distinct element of damage, is a subject for compensation.
This has frequently resulted from courts giving a wrong
reason for a correct conclusion that in a given case no
184. 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963).
185. Id. at 367–68, 122 N.W.2d at 41 (citations omitted).
186. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 238, 239–40 (1891).
187. See Village of Isle, 265 Minn. at 362, 122 N.W.2d at 38. The court was
analyzing whether a woman could recover emotional distress damages in a dram
shop action for the loss of her husband. Id.
188. Bucknam v. Great N. Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 373, 376–77, 79 N.W. 98, 98–99
(1899) (denying recovery to a woman who witnessed the defendant using “harsh,
violent and abusive language” towards her husband because the defendant did not
invade her legal interest); Larson, 47 Minn. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239 (“It is
unquestionably the law . . . that for the law to furnish redress there must be an act
which, under the circumstances, is wrongful; and it must take effect upon the
person, the property, or some other legal interest, of the party complaining.”)
(quotation omitted)).
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recovery could be had for mental suffering, placing it on
the ground that mental suffering, as a distinct element of
damage, is never a proper subject of compensation, when
the correct ground was that the act complained of was not
an infraction of any legal right, and hence not an
189
actionable wrong at all . . . .
The problem created by Village of Isle came full circle when the
190
plaintiff in Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A.,
asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to allow her to recover
191
emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action.
Because legal malpractice is a hybrid tort/contract action, the
court could not just cite Beaulieu and Francis as authority that willful
conduct is a prerequisite to recovery in pure breach of contract
192
actions. Unwilling to recognize that all legal malpractice actions
should give rise to recovery of damages for emotional distress, the
court cited the dicta in Village of Isle as authority for requiring a
193
showing of willful misconduct, even in negligence actions.
Ever
since, courts have struggled with applying Lickteig and Village of Isle
194
in direct invasion cases.
As demonstrated, the focus for emotional distress recovery has
inexplicably shifted from the defendant’s invasion of the plaintiff’s
legal interest in a highly emotional undertaking, to almost entirely
the defendant’s culpability when invading the legal interest. This
evolution is inconsistent with Larson and Sworski, which do not rely
in any way on the defendant’s culpability and, in fact, appear to
195
have involved purely negligent conduct. It also fails to appreciate
189. Larson, 47 Minn. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239.
190. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996).
191. Id. at 560.
192. See id. at 561 (“Our analysis is complicated by the hybrid nature of claims
for legal malpractice.”).
193. Id. at 560–62 (“There must be a direct violation of the plaintiff’s rights by
willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is not sufficient.”).
194. See, e.g., Gooch v. N. Country Reg’l Hosp., No. A05-576, 2006 WL 771384,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (“It is unclear in Minnesota . . . whether a
claim for wrongful interference with a dead body can be supported by a showing
of mere negligence, or whether it requires a showing of willful or wanton
misconduct similar to an NIED case.”); Schmidt v. HealthEast, No. C1-96-152, 1996
WL 310032, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11, 1996) (citing Village of Isle and
suggesting the direct invasion exception also requires proof that the plaintiff was
in the zone of danger); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat’l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 111–12
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing the direct invasion exception as informing the IIED
analysis).
195. See Sworski v. Simons, 208 Minn. 201, 203, 293 N.W. 309, 310 (1940);
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
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the original purpose of the willfulness requirement, which was to
distinguish between pure breach of contract actions and contract
196
actions involving an independent tort. And it is contradicted by
the Beaulieu court’s recognition that emotional distress damages
are recoverable in tort actions where a “legal right has been
197
invaded of a nature naturally to cause grief and distress of mind.”
The categorical approach to the independent duty rule would
allow courts to correct these inconsistencies.
C. Redefining the Limits of NIED Recovery in Direct Invasion Cases
Aside from its shaky foundation, the Lickteig court’s version of
the direct invasion exception fails to advance the underlying
purpose of granting exceptions to the general no duty rule—to
ensure that only genuine claims of emotional distress reach the
198
jury. It is difficult to comprehend how, for example, the spouse
of a recently deceased is any less likely to suffer emotional distress
upon discovering that her husband’s corpse was lost or mutilated
due to negligent conduct, than if it were lost or mutilated due to
reckless or willful conduct. Likewise, a patient misdiagnosed with a
terrible disease is no less likely to suffer emotional distress upon
learning of the diagnosis than if he or she were to later find an
expert willing to testify that the doctor made the diagnosis in
reckless disregard of the truth with knowledge that injury could
result. In short, attempting to draw a line based on the defendant’s
culpability is arbitrary, illogical, and inharmonious with the roots of
the direct invasion exception.
Reverting back to the Francis and Beaulieu courts’ strict
contract/tort distinction is also unappealing. The mere fact that
the legal interest invaded originates from a common law standard
of care rather than a contractual obligation does not ensure that
the injury is genuine. Moreover, as the dissenting justice in
Beaulieu pointed out, distinguishing a tort action from a contract
action based purely on whether the action involves an underlying
contract
196. Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 261–62, 59 N.W. 1078, 1080
(1894).
197. Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 49, 114 N.W. 353, 353 (1907).
198. See Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983)
(“We have been careful to restrict the availability of such damages to those
plaintiffs who prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending
to guarantee its genuineness.”).
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[A]mounts to defining a tort as a wrong independent of
contract. The fallacy of that definition has been clearly
and repeatedly demonstrated. It is elementary that the
distinction between contracts and torts is not
philosophical, but historical, and largely concerns the law
adjective. . . .
In point of actual number, nine-tenths of the actions
ex delicto heard by this court, and by most courts, involve
causes of action which could not be maintained without
199
pleading and proving the contract.
Since that time, of course, the contract/tort distinction has
been further blurred or eliminated in many types of cases—such as
strict products liability and professional malpractice—as a matter of
200
public policy. The same policy considerations support removing
this artificial distinction in certain breach of contract claims
201
involving highly emotional subject matters.
199. Beaulieu, 103 Minn. at 57–58, 114 N.W. at 357 (Jaggard, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, a year earlier, the Lindh court
recognized that “[i]t is elementary ‘that a tort is a violation of legal duty and may
involve as one of its elements a breach of contract.’” Lindh v. Great N. Ry. Co., 99
Minn. 408, 409, 109 N.W. 823, 824 (1906) (quoting Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382 (1882)).
200. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn.
1992) (“Although strict liability is a tort, it is really a stripped-down model of a
breach of warranty claim, with the result that the two remedies frequently
overlap.”); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(implying that legal malpractice does not fit nicely into either a breach of contract
claim or tort claim).
201. See Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981)
(“Although the general rule in Alabama is that mental anguish is not a recoverable
element of damages in an action for breach of contract, an exception to this rule .
. . has been recognized by this Court: Where the contractual duty or obligation is
so coupled with matters of mental concern or solitude . . . that a breach will
necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering . . . .” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics &
Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 93 (N.C. 1990) (“[T]he contractual
relationship provides a strong factual basis to support either a claim for emotional
distress based upon a breach of the contract or a finding of proximate causation
and foreseeability of injury sufficient to establish a tort claim for emotional
distress.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“A court might hold that, although
damages for emotional disturbance normally are not recoverable for breach of
contract, some contracts—such as burial contracts—are so intimately tied to
emotional issues that they call for an exception to the general rule.”). The Third
Restatement further recognizes that liability under the independent duty rule “can
sometimes be explained as an appendage to contract law” and encourages courts
to “be cognizant of the close relationships between tort and contract in these cases
to ensure that the rules in each area are compatible.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Like the supreme court’s early direct invasion decisions, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has more recently observed that the
direct invasion exception typically involves tort where the very
nature of the legal interest invaded tends to “naturally and directly
202
cause emotional distress.”
As a substantial number of other
jurisdictions have implicitly recognized, this observation is no less
true when those legal interests are invaded through purely
negligent conduct, such as misdiagnosing serious diseases,
mishandling corpses, committing psychological malpractice, and
203
giving erroneous death notifications. Thus, focusing back on the
emotional nature of the legal interest invaded, as opposed to the
defendant’s culpability, is how the duty analysis should be guided
in future cases.
Concededly, merely asking whether the legal interest invaded
tends to directly and naturally lead to emotional distress is far from
a bright-line rule. But at the same time, no court to date has
succeeded in reducing societal values into a single, all-inclusive rule
that strikes an appropriate balance between weeding out frivolous
emotional distress claims and compensating legitimate injuries for
204
every fact pattern that could present itself.
Accordingly, the
Third Restatement’s approach of allowing judges to define narrow,
202. Carlson v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 534, 536 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994); see also Beaulieu, 103 Minn. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353 (observing that emotional
distress damages are “limited to actions where the plaintiff has received some
injury to his person, or some legal right has been invaded of a nature naturally to
cause grief and distress of mind.”); Lindh, 99 Minn. at 409, 109 N.W. at 824 (1906)
(“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring as naturally from
disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the elements as by
dissection.”).
203. See supra Part III.B.1–3 (summarizing cases from fifteen different
jurisdictions allowing recovery for emotional distress without regard to the
defendant’s culpability).
204. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285
(Me. 1987) (“[Our prior cases] also demonstrate the frailty of supposed lines of
demarcation when they are subjected to judicial scrutiny in the context of varying
fact patterns.”); Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 424
(Mont. 1995) (“As is readily apparent, the case law demonstrates that negligent
infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort action is a thorny issue with
which this Court has struggled.”); City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex.
1997) (“Our opinion today does not attempt the perhaps impossible task of
distilling a unified theory of mental anguish from the existing precedents.”); W.E.
Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or Its Physical
Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103
(1959), superseded by 38 A.L.R.4th 998 (“The case law in the field . . . is in an almost
unparalleled state of confusion and any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the
authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed perplexity.”).
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policy-based categories of legal interests that are worthy of
protection appears to be the most logical, fair, and harmonious way
of redefining Minnesota’s direct invasion exception.
Further, providing factors to guide the courts’ analysis
eliminates some of the subjectivity inherent in the process of
determining which categories qualify, while retaining the needed
flexibility to respond to the different types of fact patterns that will
transpire. Once courts identify categories of protected legal
interests, juries would have purely objective, bright-line tests to
205
apply.
If district courts are adopting overbroad categories, de
novo appellate review is available to curtail the improper expansion
of liability.
The eight-factor test that the courts in Larson, Friedman,
206
Kallstrom, and Burgess applied is a start, but can be improved. In
207
Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme Court originally
designed that test for the very different purpose of determining
whether a specific category of conduct should be excluded from
the general rule in physical injury cases imposing a duty whenever
208
the actor increased the risk of harm.
Thus, the objective in the
Rowland analysis is to determine whether strong public policy
considerations against imposing liability override the general policy
209
of providing compensation for physical injuries. The overarching
goal in NIED cases, however, is to identify categories of legal
interests that, when invaded, tend to directly and naturally cause
205. See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980) (recognizing that
the zone of danger rule provides an objective guide for a jury to determine). As
with bystander recovery, each category of protected legal interests must also
include the class of plaintiffs with standing to pursue recovery. For example,
simply identifying preserving a corpse is not helpful unless the relationship
between the plaintiff and the deceased were limited to, for example, spouses,
parents, children, and siblings of the deceased who actually observed the body’s
mutilated condition.
206. See supra Part III.B.3 and note 129.
207. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
208. See id. at 564, superseded by statute in part on other grounds, CAL. CIV. CODE §
1714.7 (West 2009), as stated in Perez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102
(Ct. App. 1990).
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7(a)–(b) (2010); see also supra notes 115–117 (noting the Third
Restatement’s examples of situations where public policy considerations oppose
recognizing a duty, including holdings that (1) mothers owe no duty to their
unborn fetuses; (2) physicians owe no duty to third parties; (3) social hosts who
serve liquor owe no duty to third parties injured by their guests; and (4) certain
media defendants owe no duty to protect the public from physical harm due to
publishing material such as video games, books, and movies).
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210

emotional distress.
Analyzing, for example, the availability and
prevalence of insurance, the defendant’s moral blame, and the
burden on the defendant does not serve this purpose. The other
Rowland factors can be modified slightly to better serve the goal of
the duty analysis in NIED cases.
D. Proposed Guidelines for Identifying Categories of Protected Activities
Examining the considerations courts have cited as being
important when imposing a duty in NIED cases can help develop a
better set of guidelines. Grouped loosely in order of importance,
those guidelines follow.
1. Does the Relevant Industry Recognize a Standard of Care that
Requires the Defendant to Prevent Emotional Distress?
If the pertinent industry has already established a standard of
care designed to guard against causing emotional distress, then
that fact alone provides both a threshold guarantee that the
claimed emotional distress is trustworthy and fair notice to the
defendant that a breach is likely to result in liability. This is the
consideration that the Oregon Supreme Court found important in
211
Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, where the plaintiff alleged that, in
performing an MRI, the defendant undertook
[A] duty to explain the nature of the procedure, to warn
of its possible claustrophobic effects, to take an adequate
medical history in order to discover any particular physical
or psychological sensitivities that might be affected by the
procedure, and . . . to terminate the procedure if the
[plaintiff] begins to experience physical or psychological
212
difficulties.
According to the court
[W]here the standard of care in a particular medical
profession recognizes the possibility of adverse
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical
concern and dictates that certain precautions be taken to
avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate persons in
that profession from liability if they fail in those duties,

210.
211.
212.

See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
956 P.2d 960 (Or. 1998).
Id. at 963.
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213

thereby causing the contemplated harm.
This consideration is also probably applicable in cases
involving, for example, morticians preparing bodies for funerals,
doctors delivering death notifications or news of serious illnesses,
214
and psychologists treating patients for psychological disorders.
The source and notoriety of the standard should drive the weight
215
given to this factor.
2. Does the Legal Interest Involve a Highly Emotional Subject
Matter?
The highly emotional character of the undertaking or activity
is either explicitly or implicitly a central consideration in virtually
every case imposing a duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional
216
Like the first factor, the highly emotional nature of an
distress.
activity tends to both ensure that the resulting emotional distress is
trustworthy, and that the defendant had fair notice of the potential
for liability in the event of a breach.

213. Id.
214. The Curtis court analogized these allegations to “a patient’s claim against
a psychotherapist who violates the relevant standard of care by entering into a
sexual relationship with a patient, thereby causing depression or anxiety, or
against a physician who inappropriately prescribes a drug that causes or
exacerbates a psychological condition.” Id. (citing Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal.
Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1988), disagreed with on other grounds by John R. v. Oakland
Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me.
1986); Kampe v. Colom, 906 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Mazza v. Huffaker,
300 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health/Mental
Retardation Council, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 425, 428 (W. Va. 1991)).
215. For instance, a standard established by statute, ordinance, or code of
ethics could be given significant weight. A standard established by treatise, journal
article, or industry publication should be given moderate weight. And a standard
established solely by expert testimony could be given less weight.
216. See, e.g., Lindh v. Great N. Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 408, 409, 109 N.W. 823, 824
(1906) (“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring . . . naturally from
disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the elements . . . .”);
Kamrath v. Suburban Nat’l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(“[H]arm of the type Kamrath suffered, based in emotional distress, flows
naturally from [forcing an employee to undertake a polygraph examination].”);
Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(“There can be few experiences as terrifying as being pinned to a seat by gravity
forces as an airplane twists and screams toward earth at just under the speed of
sound. The nature of that experience guarantees plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress during the descent and the emergency detour to Detroit.”).
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3. Is There a Special Relationship Between the Plaintiff and
Defendant?
Courts are more likely to recognize a duty to avoid negligently
inflicting emotional distress where the breach occurred within the
confines of a special relationship rather than between complete
217
strangers.
The following elements are common to special
relationship cases: (1) the existence of a contractual relationship or
other voluntary undertaking by the defendant directly with or to
the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff’s vulnerability to emotional distress;
218
and (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s vulnerability.
The existence of a special relationship not only ensures some
rational and bright-line limits on the extent of the defendant’s
liability, but also provides some indicia of trustworthiness and fair
notice to the defendant.

217. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203–05 (Alaska 1995) (finding
that a doctor owed said duty to his patient); Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d
1197, 1203 (Cal. 1992) (finding that a doctor owed said duty to his minor patient’s
mother); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 357 (Fla. 2002) (implying that a
psychotherapist owes said duty to his patient); Rowe, 514 A.2d at 807 (“[B]ecause
of the nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, an action may be
maintained by a patient for serious mental distress caused by the negligence of his
therapist despite the absence of an underlying tort.”); Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l
Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 7–8 (Nev. 2010) (finding that a mortuary owes said
duty to the family of the deceased); Curtis, 956 P.2d at 963 (“[W]here the standard
of care in a particular medical profession recognizes the possibility of adverse
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical concern and dictates that
certain precautions be taken to avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate
persons in that profession from liability if they fail in those duties, thereby causing
the contemplated harm.”); Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762,
770 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, because of the special relationship between
a boarding school and its students, the boarding school owed a duty to avoid
negligently causing emotional harm to its student).
218. Freeman v. Harris Cnty., 183 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App. 2006).
Although Minnesota law does not discuss the direct invasion exception in terms of
special relationships, this explanation appears consistent with Minnesota’s
treatment of emotional distress resulting from statutory violations. Compare
Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at 112 (holding employer’s violation of statutory duty to not
subject employees to polygraph test permitted recovery for resulting emotional
distress), with Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 55–57, 114 N.W. 353,
356–57 (1907) (holding telegraph company’s violation of statutory duty to deliver
telegraphs did not permit recovery for resulting emotional distress).
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4. Is the Occurrence of Emotional Distress a Foreseeable Consequence
of the Breach?
Although related to the second factor, the foreseeability
question differs in that it focuses on the defendant’s perspective,
219
rather than on the nature of the undertaking in general. While
many authorities provide a convincing reason for denying
220
dispositive significance to the foreseeability consideration, its
221
But
well-established role in the duty analysis cannot be denied.
the highly subjective nature of this inquiry should slightly diminish
its importance in the overall analysis.
5. Is the Injury Likely to be Experienced by an Appreciable Number of
the Population, as Opposed to the Rare, Idiosyncratic Hypersensitive,
or Unusual Minority?
The foreseeability of the injury should be examined from the
standpoint of the “normally constituted” or “ordinarily sensitive”
222
plaintiff, not the hypersensitive or idiosyncratic.
Importantly,
however, this consideration is not to be confused with denying a
particular plaintiff damages because of unusual sensitivity. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the eggshell plaintiff
doctrine in the emotional distress context, distinguishing between
the foreseeability of some harm versus the foreseeability of the
ultimate harm:

219. Using the example of handling a corpse, the foreseeability prong would
provide a different result for a rail carrier employee who caused damage by failing
to cover the casket during transport from a passenger who was unaware of the
corpse’s presence and negligently caused a fire that destroyed all cargo aboard,
including the corpse. Although the legal interest invaded would be highly
emotional in both instances, emotional distress to the deceased’s family would
arguably be foreseeable to the former, but not the latter.
220. See supra notes 150–51.
221. See Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136,
138 (1967) (“The common-law test of duty is the probability or foreseeability of
injury to plaintiff.”); see also La Fleur v. Mosher, 325 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Wis. 1982)
(discussing foreseeability as a relevant consideration in determining whether to
recognize a categorical exception); supra Part III.B.1.
222. See Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me.
1987) (“A defendant is bound to foresee psychic harm only when such harm
reasonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person.”); Bass v.
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 773–74 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (remanding for trial
on whether the defendant could have foreseen that an ordinary person would
suffer significant emotional distress while trapped in a stuck elevator).
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A more difficult question is the broad problem of
compensating one whose injuries are the result of unusual
sensitivity or susceptibility to shock. Much has been
written on the subject, both by courts and commentators.
Defendant vigorously argues that plaintiffs should not be
entitled to recover for injuries which defendant could not
reasonably foresee.
However, we have held that
foreseeability is a test of negligence and not of damages.
If defendant can foresee some harm to one to whom he
owes a duty, the exact nature and extent of the harm need
not be foreseeable to permit recovery for all of the
223
damages proximately caused.
Accordingly, this factor only examines—on a categorical, not
case-by-case, basis—whether an appreciable portion of the
population is likely to experience some emotional harm. A
plaintiff falling within this category can recover even if the extent
of his or her emotional distress was unforeseeable because of an
unusual susceptibility to emotional distress.
This was the consideration that the Friedman court found
dispositive when it denied recovery to a strict ethical vegan who
alleged emotional distress stemming from his discovery that a
224
Discovery of a
tuberculosis test contained animal byproducts.
putrid object in food, on the other hand, is an example of
something that would no doubt trigger a negative emotional
response by an appreciable or substantial portion of the
225
population.
6.

Is the Category Narrowly Defined to Ensure Commonality?

The concern against protecting only the idiosyncratic,
hypersensitive, or unusual minority of the population must be
balanced against the danger of classifying categories of legal
interests too broadly. This factor derives from the Alaska Supreme
223. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1969).
224. Friedman v. Merck & Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 892–95 (Ct. App. 2003).
225. Several jurisdictions recognize a duty to avoid negligently causing
emotional distress by way of contaminated food. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d reporters’ note
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (citing Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d
1234 (Fla. 2001); Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me.
1970), overruled on other grounds by Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets Inc., 444
A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982)).
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Court’s concerns when it declined to recognize a duty to avoid
emotional distress in all cases where the defendant causes the
226
plaintiff to unknowingly injure a third party. The test is whether
the potential factual variations among cases falling within a
proposed category could vary so widely that the classification does
227
very little to ensure that class members’ injuries are genuine.
This factor also demands precise definition of the particular
class of plaintiffs with standing to claim membership in the
protected category. Where the breach arises out of a contractual
228
relationship, perhaps only parties to the contract can recover.
Where the breach derives from a statutory requirement, a
negligence per se analysis can be used to define the class of
229
qualifying plaintiffs.
In the rare case where there is no
underlying tort or contract violation, courts must make public
230
policy distinctions to define the scope of the class.
7. Have Other Jurisdictions Recognized a Duty for that Particular
Category of Activity?
When recognizing new torts, Minnesota courts consistently
231
consider how other jurisdictions have addressed the issue.
Similarly, examination of whether other jurisdictions have
recognized a particular category of activity as permitting NIED
226. Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167–68 (Alaska 2002).
227. Id. at 167.
228. For instance, a court may find that in negligent diagnosis cases, only the
patient can directly recover for the resulting emotional distress, not members of
his or her family.
229. See, e.g., Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 577 (La. 1990)
(“In determining whether the bus driver’s violation was a breach of a delictual
duty owed specially and directly to [the plaintiff] it is necessary to examine the
purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether [the plaintiff] falls within the
class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained
of was of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.”).
230. See, e.g., Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev.
2010) (holding that family members can maintain a negligent emotional distress
claim against a mortuary regarding the handling of a loved one’s remains but may
not pursue a claim against the county coroner). In Boorman, the court found a
distinction between the nature of the duty undertaken by a county coroner, who
does not have a contract with the deceased’s family, and a private mortuary, which
does. Id. at 8–10. Because of this distinction, the court held that the coroner was
only liable to “the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body,” and
the mortuary was only liable to “close family members who are aware of both the
death of a loved one and that mortuary services were being performed.” Id. at 8–9.
231. Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn. 2007); Lake v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998).
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recovery, and the success of those decisions, should guide a
Minnesota court’s analysis.
8. Do Other Considerations Provide Guarantees of the Genuineness
and Materiality of the Emotional Distress?
A catchall factor gives courts the needed flexibility in
responding to endless factual circumstances, changing societal
norms, new technologies, and the unpredictable ways that genuine
emotional distress could result from negligent conduct.
9. Do Strong Countervailing Public Policy Considerations Militate
Against Imposing a Duty?
This factor is borrowed from the Third Restatement’s
232
exception to the general duty rule in physical injury cases. Like
physical injury cases, there may be exceptional cases where strong
public policy considerations warrant denying liability. For instance,
a proposed category of activities may so strongly implicate the First
Amendment that imposing liability could risk curtailing the
defendant’s freedom of speech.
V. CONCLUSION
The categorical approach to defining the scope of NIED
recovery strikes an appropriate balance between objectivity and
flexibility. Carefully identifying narrow categories of activities that
naturally and foreseeably tend to cause emotional distress in the
event of a breach is a far fairer, more rational, and more
jurisprudentially sound approach to defining the limits of NIED
recovery than Minnesota’s existing limits. With the guidance of a
factor-based test and appellate supervision, judges can adequately
assure that plaintiffs will not flood the courthouses with spurious or
trivial claims. After that, modern science and the time-honored
role of the jury can adequately ensure that only genuine injuries
are compensated.

232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
HARM § 7(b) (2010).
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